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REFORMING STATE LAWS ON HOW BUSINESSES CAN BAN
GUNS: “NO GUNS” SIGNS, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
Christine M. Quinn*
ABSTRACT
Every state has different regulations regarding how businesses can ban guns.
Some states mandate that specific signs be posted in specific places while other states
say nothing on the issue. This Note first establishes that even under Heller and
McDonald, private business owners have a right to control their private property,
which includes a right to prohibit their customers from carrying firearms into their
buildings. It then introduces some states’ requirements for “No Guns” signs and
examines their weaknesses, particularly from a First Amendment, compelled speech
perspective. The Note concludes that some current state regulations are ineffective,
unclear, and outright unconstitutional. It then proposes a uniform model regula-
tion for state adoption which features a standard, simple sign design.
INTRODUCTION
Today, many states have “guns everywhere” laws that allow fire-
arms in bars, churches, schools, and government buildings.1
Additionally, forty-five states permit the open carry of handguns2
and every state, including the District of Columbia, allows some
form of concealed carry.3 At the same time, the U.S. firearm homi-
cide rate is twenty times higher than the combined rates of twenty-
two similarly developed countries.4 In an average year in America,
* J.D. Candidate, May 2017, University of Michigan Law School. With thanks to the
team at the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence’s Legal Action Project, who inspired me to
write this Note, and to the editors of the Michigan Journal of Law Reform. Although I started
looking into this subject as an intern at the Brady Center’s Legal Action Project in 2015, the
arguments and the proposals expressed in this Note are solely my own and do not represent
the position of the organization.
1. Susannah Griffee, Guns, Everywhere, THE NEW YORKER (Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.
newyorker.com/news/news-desk/guns-everywhere.
2. Open Carrying, L. CENT. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, http://smartgunlaws.org/gun-
laws/policy-areas/firearms-in-public-places/open-carrying/ (last visited May 3, 2017).
3. Concealed Weapons Permitting, L. CENT. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, http://smart
gunlaws.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/firearms-in-public-places/concealed-weapons-permit
ting/ (last visited May 3, 2017).
4. About Gun Violence, BRADY CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, http:///www.brady
campaign.org/about-gun-violence (last visited May 3, 2017).
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55,009 people survive shootings; 16,334 people are shot uninten-
tionally and survive; 11,294 people are murdered with guns; and
561 people are accidently killed with guns.5
In Heller and McDonald the Supreme Court recognized the indi-
vidual right to bear arms for self-protection,6 but the grim statistics
on gun violence suggest that individuals should also be empowered
to protect themselves from guns by enforcing the right of business
owners to ban customers from carrying guns into their facilities.7
This particular right has largely been unexplored by courts. Legisla-
tures occasionally try to fill the gap but often leave business owners
uncertain about how best to protect themselves and their custom-
ers. From state to state, the laws governing how business owners
exercise their right to ban guns are not only diverse, but they are
also often unclear, ineffective, and sometimes simply unconstitu-
tional.8 This makes it difficult, if not impossible, for a business
owner to enforce his property rights safely. For example, some state
laws, such as Kansas’s, require that an authorized representative of
the business approach the armed customer and ask him9 to leave,
even after he has seen and ignored the legally compliant “No Guns”
sign in the window.10 Only after the armed customer refuses to
leave is he committing a crime.11 Other states’ sign requirements
are so burdensome they violate the First Amendment’s prohibition
of government compelled speech: the State’s ability to dictate the
size, content, and placement of signs on private property is limited
by the First Amendment.12 For example, Texas’s law that requires
the posting of giant signs that convey extensive government speech
5. See Victims of Gun Violence Fact Sheet, BRADY CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE,
http:///www.bradycampaign.org/sites/default/files/
Gun%20Deaths%20Fact%20Sheet_Mar2016.pdf (last visited May 3, 2017) (numbers calcu-
lated by the author from the information provided in this source).
6. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579 (2008); see also McDonald v. City
of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010).
7. See Joseph Blocher, The Right Not to Keep and Bear Arms, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1, 44-45
(2012).
8. See infra Part II.
9. According to a recent Gallup study, men are three times more likely than women to
own guns in America. Therefore, though both men and women carry guns, for ease and
clarity of writing, throughout this Note I use male pronouns rather than “he or she.” See,
Jeffrey M. Jones, Men, Married, Southerners Most Likely to be Gun Owners, GALLUP, INC. (Feb. 1,
2013), http:///www.gallup.com/poll/160223/men-married-southerners-likely-gun-
owners.aspx.
10. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-7c24, -7c10 (Supp. 2016); see also KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 16-
11-7 (Supp. 2016).
11. See §§ 75-7c24, -7c10.
12. See infra Part II.B.
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in English and Spanish is so unduly burdensome on business own-
ers that it is unconstitutional.13 Because “No Guns” sign posting
laws vary widely by states in their requirements, in their location in
the code, and in their penalties for violations, it is also very difficult
for a national business to adopt a uniform policy.
This Note explores the contours of state laws regulating the right
to ban guns from one’s own business. Part I introduces and summa-
rizes critical federal and state precedent and laws that effect a
business’ ability to ban firearms, such as the constitutional right to
bear arms, state approaches to the regulation of carrying guns in
public, the right to ban firearms on private property, and some
state laws outlining how businesses can ban guns. Part II looks at
select states’ requirements for “No Guns” signs more closely and
highlights several weaknesses. It then focuses on some sign require-
ments’ violations of the First Amendment prohibition of compelled
speech. Part III argues that states should uniformly amend their
trespass or firearms codes to automatically impose criminal sanc-
tions for carrying a handgun or long gun (open or concealed) onto
private property conspicuously marked with the standard symbol
many states have already adopted, a pictogram—small enough to
be printed from a computer—of a gun with a circle around it and a
slash through it. The prohibition sign should be accompanied by
the words: “Open and Concealed Carry of Firearms Prohibited
Under [statute number cite].”
I. A BRIEF SURVEY OF GUN LAWS IN AMERICA TODAY
Part I of the Note will first provide a brief overview of the consti-
tutional right to bear arms and state gun laws. It will then outline
the right of private property owners to ban guns from their prop-
erty. Finally, it will provide an introduction to select states’
approaches to regulating how businesses can ban guns.
A. The Supreme Court’s Right to Bear Arms
No discussion of gun laws today can occur without an under-
standing of the two Supreme Court cases that set the scene for
modern gun regulation: the 2008 decision in Heller and the 2010
decision in McDonald. In Heller, the Supreme Court established an
individual right to keep and bear arms, striking down two District of
13. See infra Part II.
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Columbia laws—one that banned handguns even in the home and
one that required any lawful firearms in the home be disabled.14
Until that point, it was still up for debate whether the Second
Amendment conferred a right to participate in a well-regulated mi-
litia or a right to have firearms for personal use.15 Heller’s holding
was limited; it said there was an individual right to keep and bear
ready-to-use arms for the purpose of self-defense. It went as far as to
define “bear” as “carry,” but it did not hold that an individual had
the right to bear arms outside the home.16 Further, the Court in
Heller made clear that reasonable restrictions on who can possess
guns, where they can carry them, and the type of guns they can
carry, are constitutional.17 Finally, perhaps most important to our
analysis here, the Court based all of its holdings on an exhaustive
historical analysis, reading the Second Amendment in the context it
was written. The court stated:
A constitutional guarantee subject to future judges’ assess-
ments of its usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at all.
Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were
understood to have when the people adopted them, whether
or not future legislatures or (yes) even future judges think that
scope too broad.18
Two years later, the Court in McDonald held for the first time, in a
five–four decision, that the Second Amendment, as interpreted in
Heller, applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s
due process clause.19
McDonald and Heller left open many questions that lower courts
and legislatures are now trying to address in their analysis of state
firearms regulations. The Supreme Court in Heller and McDonald
made clear that the Second Amendment could be limited because
even the founders did not contemplate an absolute right. To em-
phasize this point, the Court listed a few approved limits, such as
“dangerous or unusual weapons,” possession in schools or govern-
ment buildings, possession by the felonious or the insane, and
regulation of firearms sellers.20 However, the Court in Heller and
McDonald did not opine on the constitutionality of several other
14. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
15. Id. at 628–29.
16. See id. at 625.
17. Id. at 626.
18. Id. at 634–35.
19. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010).
20. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008).
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common types of firearms regulations, such as enforcing a busi-
ness’s private property right to prohibit firearms.
B. State Approaches to Carry Laws
Following Heller and the post-Obama conservative resurgence,
states have increasingly passed “guns everywhere” laws.21 Georgia’s
2014 law, for example, now permits the carry of concealed firearms
with a permit in bars, nightclubs, school classrooms and churches
(with the permission of the school and church), and some govern-
ment buildings.22 Missouri, Oklahoma, Tennessee and other states
have passed similarly permissive laws.23
Each state’s laws vary on several aspects, based on the state’s dif-
fering interpretation of the rights that are and should be granted
under McDonald: Does the state allow “open carry,” or “concealed
carry,” or both? Are long guns regulated at all? Is a permit required
for a handgun? Is it a “may-issue” or “shall-issue” state? May land-
lords ban their tenants from having guns in their homes? From
their hotels? May employers ban employees from having guns in
the office or the parking lot? How can business owners ban custom-
ers from carrying guns into their businesses?
Handgun laws can permit open carry (visible to the public) or
concealed carry (on your person, but not visible) or some variation
thereof based on location or possession of a permit. Thirty-one
states allow open carrying of handguns without a permit24 and
eleven states allow concealed carrying of handguns without a per-
mit.25 Every state permits concealed carry with a permit in some
form, but the requirements for permits vary widely.26 Thirty states
are “shall issue” states, which means that the state must issue permits
to everyone that meets a certain minimum criteria that typically
mirror the criteria required for firearm purchases.27 Nine states are
“may issue” states that typically impose minimum criteria but leave
21. Susannah Griffee, Guns, Everywhere, THE NEW YORKER (Apr. 20, 2012), http://
www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/guns-everywhere. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. 70-24-110
(2015).
22. Michele Richinick, Georgia’s ‘Gun’s Everywhere’ Bill Takes Effect, MSNBC (July 1, 2014,
12:01 PM), http:///www.msnbc.com/msnbc/georgia-guns-everywhere-bill-takes-effect.
23. Id.
24. Open Carrying, supra note 2.
25. Concealed Weapons Permitting, supra note 3.
26. Id.
27. Id.; see also, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. 53-5-704(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2016) (“The bureau
shall issue a permit to carry a concealed firearm for lawful self defense to an applicant who is
21 years of age or older within 60 days after receiving an application, unless the bureau finds
proof that the applicant does not meet the qualifications set forth in Subsection (2)”).
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the final decision to the discretion of the sheriff or other issuing
authority.28 Only fourteen states require applicants to justify why
they need to carry a concealed handgun and only twenty-seven
states require any (even nominal) firearm safety training.29
The most common rule is if it is legal for you to carry it in public
at all, you can carry it anywhere open to the public that is not on
the state’s list of prohibited places (e.g., statehouse, schools,
churches, sometimes bars). Handguns or pistols generally have
more carry restrictions than what are called “long guns,” that is,
rifles, AR-15s, and shotguns; only six states ban the open carry of
long guns and only six other states restrict it in any way.30 Carrying
long guns out in public—wearing your AR-15 to J.C. Penney, walk-
ing down Main Street with an assault rifle,31 or bringing them to
Chipotle—is perfectly legal in many states.32 Carrying a handgun
into a private business, either openly or concealed depending on
the state, is generally legal.33 In many states, private business owners
can only ban guns from their property by certain methods ap-
proved by state law.
C. The Right to Exclude Guns from Businesses Open to the Public
Before we discuss the shortcomings of the laws governing how
business owners can exercise their right to exclude guns, it is im-
portant to establish that businesses have the right to exclude. In the
influential 2012 case, GeorgiaCarry.org, the Eleventh Circuit ce-
mented this principal by marrying trespass law maxims to the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Second Amendment in Hel-
ler.34 In GeorgiaCarry.org, the defendants argued that a statute that
permitted places of worship to ban weapons and long guns in their
28. Concealed Weapons Permitting, supra note 3.
29. Id.
30. There are no concealed carry restrictions on long guns because they are too large to
conceal. Open Carrying, supra note 2.
31. See, e.g., Cavan Sieczkowski, Joseph Kelley, Utah Man, Takes Rifle to J.C. Penney to Show
Guns Can Be Safe, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 18, 2013, 1:26 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2013/01/18/joseph-kelley-gun-rifle-jc-penney-guns-safe-law-abiding-citizens_n_250414
2.html.
32. Gail Sullivan, Chipotle Asks Customers to Leave Assault Rifles at Home, WASH. POST (May
20, 2014), https:///www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/05/20/chipot
le-asks-customers-to-leave-assault-rifles-at-home/.
33. It is presumptively legal to carry guns into private businesses, otherwise states would
not make laws specifically banning them from certain places, e.g., bars or places with volunta-
rily posted compliant “No Guns” signs.
34. GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1261 (11th Cir. 2012).
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buildings with the force of law was a violation of their First Amend-
ment right to freely exercise their religion as well as a violation of
their Second Amendment right to bear arms.35 The court found
that there was no First Amendment protection for the secular per-
sonal preference to bear arms and that the Second Amendment
right to bear arms did not trump the “fundamental right” to ex-
clude on private property.36
According to the Eleventh Circuit, the Second Amendment, as
outlined by the Supreme Court in Heller, did not forbid “enforcing
the Carry Law against a license holder who carries a firearm on
private property against the owner’s instructions. . . .”37 Indeed, the
Eleventh Circuit found that Heller mandated that Second Amend-
ment claims be read in the context of the historical background of
the Amendment because according to Heller, the Amendment
“codified a pre-existing right.”38 The court further stated:
Plaintiffs cannot contend that the Second Amendment in any
way abrogated the well-established property law, tort law, and
criminal law that embodies a private property owner’s exclu-
sive right to be king of his own castle. By codifying a pre-
existing right, the Second Amendment did not expand, ex-
tend, or enlarge the individual right to bear arms at the
expense of other fundamental rights; rather, the Second
Amendment merely preserved the status quo of the right that
existed at the time.39
The court based their holding—that a private property owner has a
right to exclude guns—on Blackstone and the writings of the
founding fathers. The court noted that “William Blackstone de-
scribed a private property owner’s right to exclusive control over his
or her own property as a sacred and inviolable right[ ].”40 The court
also stated that the founding fathers sought to protect the funda-
mental rights of property, not limit them, through the Constitution
and Bill of Rights, citing John Adams’s Defence of the Constitutions of
Government of the United States, where he wrote: “The moment the
idea is admitted into society that property is not as sacred as the
35. Id. at 1258.
36. Id. at 1258, 1264.
37. Id. at 1266.
38. Id. at 1264.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1261–62 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also id. at 1262–63
(“Implied in this private action, as Blackstone explained it, is an exclusive right of an owner
to eject an individual from the owner’s property and initiate a civil trespass action.”).
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laws of God, and that there is not a force of law and public justice to
protect it, anarchy and tyranny commence.”41
Other courts have made similar holdings in the context of em-
ployment law, finding that an employer can ban its employees from
having firearms in its buildings. For example, the Supreme Court of
Utah in Hansen v. America Online, Inc. held that “despite its muscu-
lar claim to be one of our state’s clear and substantial public
policies, the right of an employee to keep and bear arms cannot
supplant the right of an employer to regulate the possession of fire-
arms by employees within the workplace environment.”42
However, courts have also upheld some states’ laws prohibiting
businesses from banning guns in their parking lots.43 For example,
in Ramsey Winch Inc. v. Henry, the Tenth Circuit stated that business
owners required to permit employees to store guns in their locked
cars in the business’s parking lots have “not suffered an unconstitu-
tional infringement of their property rights, but rather are required
by the [state law] to recognize a state-protected right of their em-
ployees.”44 While these are related issues, they are beyond the scope
of this Note, which focuses on the ability of a business to ban cus-
tomers from carrying firearms into their buildings through the use
of signs.
D. Current State Law on How Businesses Can Ban Firearms
While the right to ban firearms from one’s own building has
largely been recognized, there is a striking lack of uniformity in
how, and if, that right is protected under state law. “No Guns” sign
posting laws vary widely by state in their requirements, in their loca-
tion in the code, and in their penalties for violations. Beyond
simple trespass law, many states have no laws on the books on the
subject at all. The state laws governing a business owner’s right to
ban guns are not only all different, but individually, they are often
convoluted, unclear, unjust, and sometimes simply unconstitu-
tional, making it difficult if not impossible for a business owner to
enforce his or her property rights safely. The state’s ability to dic-
tate the size, content, and placement of signs on private property is
41. Id. at 1265 (citing JOHN ADAMS, DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES (1787), reprinted in 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 3, 9 (Charles Francis
Adams ed., 1851)).
42. Hansen v. America Online, Inc., 96 P.3d 950, 953 (Utah 2004).
43. See Blocher, supra note 7, at 41.
44. Ramsey Winch Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199, 1209 (10th Cir. 2009).
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limited by the First Amendment. Kansas and Texas are two telling
examples of the diversity of state regulation in this field.
1. Kansas
According to Kansas’s concealed carry law, to ban concealed
handguns or unconcealed firearms from the premises, business
owners must post a state-created pictogram of a black handgun in a
red circle with a slash through it (the universal prohibition sign).45
The circle must be at least six inches in diameter, unobstructed,
posted at all entrances no more than twelve inches from the door
and between four and six feet from the ground.46 However, even if
a business follows the sign requirements exactly and an individual
sees, understands, and ignores the sign, he is not automatically sub-
ject to criminal sanctions under the concealed carry law.47 Violators
are not subject to criminal sanctions unless the owner or other au-
thorized person personally asks them to leave the premises.48 If they
then refuse to leave, they may be prosecuted for criminal trespass,
which is a Class B Misdemeanor.49 A Class B Misdemeanor is pun-
ishable under Kansas law by imprisonment not to exceed six
months50 and/or a fine not to exceed $1,000.51 A posting of the
state-designed “No Gun” sign alone in the correct manner appar-
ently does not meet the requirements of Kansas trespassing law,
which requires either a personal request to vacate the premise by
the owner or authorized person or the posting of “No Trespassing”
signs in a “manner reasonably likely to come to the attention of
intruders.”52
2. Texas
By contrast, in Texas, open carry and concealed carry of hand-
guns53 are forbidden on private property without the owner’s
“effective consent,” and certain signs by themselves have the force
45. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-7c24, 75-7c10 (Supp. 2016); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 16-11-7
(Supp. 2016).
46. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-7c24, 75-7c10; KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 16-11-7.
47. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-7c24, 75-7c10; KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 16-11-7.
48. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-7c24, 75-7c10; KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 16-11-7.
49. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5808 (Supp. 2016).
50. Id. § 21-6602.
51. Id. § 21-6611.
52. Id. § 21-5808.
53. There is no law regarding the carrying of long guns on private property.
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of law.54 The Texas Penal Code also has specific provisions regard-
ing trespassing with handguns.55 It is a Class A Misdemeanor to
carry a handgun openly or concealed on private property after re-
ceiving personal oral notice that handguns are forbidden by the
property owner or a person empowered to act with the owner’s au-
thority.56 A Class A Misdemeanor is punishable by a fine not to
exceed $4,000 and/or a jail term not to exceed one year.57 How-
ever, it is also a Class C Misdemeanor just to carry, whether openly
or concealed, on private property that has posted signs according to
the requirements of §§ 30.06 and/or 30.07.58 Unlike a property
owner in Kansas, a private property owner in Texas with 30.06 and
30.07 complaint signs does not have to ask the trespasser to leave in
order for criminal trespass law to come into force.59 However, a
Class C Misdemeanor in this context is punishable only by a fine
not to exceed $200.60
Texas’s sign requirements are significantly more burdensome
than Kansas’s. To be effective, a 30.06 sign must be clearly visible to
the public and read exactly (in English and Spanish with contrasting
colored block letters at least an inch high): “Pursuant to Section
30.06, Penal Code (trespass by license holder with a concealed
handgun), a person licensed under Subchapter H, Chapter 411,
Government Code (handgun licensing law), may not enter this
property with a concealed handgun.”61 As of January 1, 2016, busi-
ness owners seeking to ban open carry of handguns, as well as
concealed carry, have to post conspicuously, a second sign (in En-
glish and Spanish with contrasting colored block letters at least an
inch high) that reads exactly: “Pursuant to Section 30.07, Penal
Code (trespass by license holder with an openly carried handgun),
a person licensed under Subchapter H, Chapter 411, Government
Code (handgun licensing law), may not enter this property with a
handgun that is carried openly.” The required Spanish language
54. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 30.06–.07 (West 2011 & Supp. 2016).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. PENAL § 12.21 (West 2011).
58. PENAL §§ 30.06(b), 30.07(b) (West 2011 & Supp. 2016). Until the law was first
amended in 2003, it was also Class A Misdemeanor just to violate the sign. See 1997 Tex. Sess.
Law Serv. Ch. 126, § 23 (H.B. 2909) (West) (current version at TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 30.06 (West 2011 & Supp. 2016)).
59. PENAL §§ 30.06(b), 30.07(b).
60. PENAL §§ 30.06(d), 30.07(d).
61. PENAL § 30.06(c)(3)(A)–(B)(iii); 2015 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 437, § 43 (H.B. 910)
(West) (making it a criminal offense for a licensed handgun holder to openly carry a hol-
stered handgun).
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translation for either sign is not provided in the statute or in any
known official publication by the Texas government.62
A single 30.06 sign can cost forty-one dollars and may need to be
at least two feet tall by two feet wide to meet the statutory require-
ment.63 It also must be “displayed in a conspicuous manner clearly
visible to the public.”64 After the January 2016 legalization of the
open carry of handguns in Texas, a second, equally large, sign is
also required to bar handguns completely from a business. This
means that businesses wanting to ban handguns on their premises
must post two signs, whose combined size could be at least four feet
tall by two feet wide. Some of the Texas carry community interpret
the law to mean if a single word is missing, or if the font is nine-
tenths of an inch high instead of one inch high, they are legally and
morally authorized to carry inside the business.65
Texas and Kansas are choice examples of “No Gun” sign regula-
tions that are so fraught with flaws that they do not sufficiently
protect a business owners’ right to ban firearms from their facilities.
II. CURRENT STATE LAWS ON HOW BUSINESSES CAN BAN FIREARMS
Part II will first highlight the particular features of the patchwork
of state laws that make them ineffective and unsafe. It will then ar-
gue that requiring large signs, like Texas’s, is unconstitutional
under the First Amendment as unduly burdensome government
compelled speech.
A. How State Laws Have Failed Businesses
As mentioned previously, the divergence from state to state on
how businesses can ban guns makes it very difficult for a national
62. PENAL §§ 30.06–.07.
63. As of January 1, 2016, for their signs to have the force of law, businesses must acquire
and post new 30.06 signs (in addition to the new 30.07 signs) reflecting a minute change in
the wording of law (conceal carry permits have just become carry permits). PENAL
§§ 30.06–.07. For examples of complaint signs available online, see Concealed Carry Texas Sign
NHB-28237, COMPLIANCESIGNS.COM, www.compliancesigns.com/NHB-28237.shtml (last vis-
ited May 3, 2017).
64. PENAL § 30.06(c)(3)(B)(iii).
65. Tom Benning, ‘No open carry’ signs are likely to trigger the next Texas gun debate, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS (June 2015), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/local-politics/2015/06/21/
no-open-carry-signs-are-likely-to-trigger-next-texas-gun-debate. See generally Your 30.06 & 30.07
Information Resource, TEXAS3006.COM, https://www.texas3006.com/view.php (last visited May
3, 2017) (containing a user-created list of 30.06 and 30.07 signs with comments about their
various defects).
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business to adopt a uniform policy. This often results in businesses
that might otherwise ban guns to settle for vaguely requesting that
their customers not bring guns into their premises. Starbucks, for
example, asked customers not to bring guns into their stores, saying
that some customers have been “uncomfortable to see guns in their
stores . . . especially when small kids are around.”66 However, ac-
cording to Starbucks policy, “store employees will not ask customers
who come in with guns in holsters . . . to leave or confront them in
any way. . . . No signs explaining the policy will be posted in
Starbucks stores, either.”67 Starbucks has a right to choose to ban
guns in order to protect its customers and staff, but because many
states do not have specific laws protecting this property right and
those that do have such varied requirements, it is impossible to
comply uniformly. Therefore, Starbucks is unable to effectively ex-
ercise their right—rendering the right a dead letter.
State laws on how to ban guns are also difficult to find and inter-
pret. In some states, the ability to ban firearms from private
property is never specifically mentioned and has to be read into the
general trespass law.68 In other states, it is specifically mentioned in
trespass law as a particular type of trespass, e.g., trespass with a fire-
arm.69 In other states, the regulation on how to ban firearms is
found in the statute regulating the concealed carry of handguns.70
This placement makes it unclear whether businesses can similarly
ban long guns and open carry. Because the statute’s placement in
the code can invoke confusion regarding its application, even law
enforcement seeking to enforce the code may be uncertain of the
relevant regulations’ effects and scope.
Many state laws, such as Kansas’s, require that an authorized rep-
resentative of the business approach the person with the gun and
ask them to leave even after they have seen the legally compliant
“No Guns” sign in the window.71 This renders the sign and the law
ineffective, because under all trespass law, if a person is asked to
leave private property and he refuses, he is trespassing. This also
puts store employees in the awkward, if not frightening, position of
being forced to confront gun carriers in order to enforce their
66. Stephanie Strom, Starbucks Seeks to Keep Guns Out of Its Coffee Shops, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/19/business/starbucks-seeks-to-keep-guns-out-
of-its-cofee-shops.html.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Miss. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 2013-00114, 2013 Miss. AG LEXIS 111 (2013).
69. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 810.09(2)(c) (West 2017).
70. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-415.11(c)(8) (West 2015); LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1379.3(O) (Supp. 2017).
71. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-7c24, -7c10 (Supp. 2016); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 16-11-7 (Supp.
2016).
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property rights, where, in contrast, under the simple trespass stat-
ute, a clearly posted sign would be sufficient to bar even unarmed
people.72
People consent to be governed on the understanding that if we
give the government a monopoly of the legitimate use of force, the
government will maintain rule of law and protect our lives and pri-
vate property for us.73 Many states provide unclear and limited
protection for a business’s right to ban arms, which guts a funda-
mental property right that the state was created to protect. Just as
an individual knows he can rely on the police to enforce and pun-
ish violations of his property right if someone trespasses on his
clearly posted private land, so too should he know he can rely on
the police to protect him and punish people who trespass into his
business with guns in violation of clearly posted signs. A right does
not effectively exist if no one knows they have it, how to exercise it,
or if the government’s restrictions on the ability to exercise the
right are themselves otherwise unconstitutional.
B. Government Signs on Private Property and the First Amendment
As discussed above, the right to exclude from one’s property is a
fundamental right; the Second Amendment does not give an indi-
vidual the right to bring firearms into someone’s business against
the owner’s will.74 The First Amendment’s limitation of compelled
speech applies when the government requires a business to relay
government speech, like a sign, in order to obtain an essential gov-
ernment benefit, like the protection of property rights.75 Generally,
requiring business owners to post specific signs if they wish to pro-
hibit guns on the premises with the force of law is unlikely to
infringe on First Amendment rights.76 Just like the state can require
specific placement and wording of “No Trespassing” signs to estab-
lish that an individual was given effective notice that they are not
72. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5808 (Supp. 2016) (outlining that an individual is in violation
of the basic trespass law just by entering a premises in defiance of appropriate signage).
73. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 123–26 (Richard Cox, ed.,
Harlan Davidson, Inc. 1988) (1690) (Social Contract Theory).
74. See GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1261 (11th Cir. 2012).
75. See All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 651 F.3d 218, 234 (2d
Cir. 2011) (“Compelling speech as a condition of receiving a government benefit cannot be
squared with the First Amendment”).
76. See N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 131–32 (2d Cir. 2009)
(holding that laws compelling restaurants to post calorie counts on menus was commercial
speech and was therefore constitutional since commercial speech is less protected than non-
commercial speech).
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welcome, the state likely can require specific placement and word-
ing of “No Guns” signs. Signs, such as Kansas’ six-inch pictogram,
that are purely informative as to store policy and are reasonable in
size, so as to give effective notice to potential customers without
unduly burdening the business owners, are not likely to be found to
be unconstitutional compelled speech.77
However, other sign posting laws that are more similar to those
of Texas have been found to be unconstitutional compelled speech
because their size and content requirements are unduly burden-
some and restrictive.78 If a state’s “No Guns” sign posting
requirements force business owners to post non-factual or contro-
versial government speech, or to post a sign in a manner that
unduly impedes their own speech, the law violates the business
owner’s First Amendment rights.79 The excessively large signs and
detailed requirements are not necessary to achieve the only con-
ceivably legitimate purpose of notice; the only conclusion this Note
can draw is that they are the Texas legislature’s way of trying to
make it difficult for storeowners to exercise their right to exclude
firearms. The sign impedes business owners’ own speech by taking
up large amounts of space in their businesses and by forcing the
businesses to use the government’s language to convey their posi-
tion on a controversial issue.80
The level of scrutiny courts will apply depends on which circuit
the case is brought in and if the “No Guns” signs are found to be
commercial speech which conveys an uncontroversial fact. The
next Part will review the current state of the law on compelled
speech and explain why, if the Texas law and laws like it are re-
viewed, a court would be hard pressed to find the law sufficiently
narrowly tailored or the government interest sufficiently substantial
or compelling.
1. A Closer Look at Compelled Speech
An individual’s or business’so First Amendment right to speak
freely or remain silent is not unlimited. “Core political speech” en-
joys the most First Amendment protection; it is defined as
“[c]onduct or words that are directly intended to rally public sup-
port for a particular issue, position, or candidate; expressions,
77. See, e.g., Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 2001); See also
Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 524 (6th Cir. 2012).
78. See, e.g., Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136 (1994).
79. See, e.g., Evergreen Ass’n v. City of New York, 740 F.3d 233, 245–50 (2d Cir. 2014).
80. Id. at 245.
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proposals, or interactive communication concerning political
change.”81 However, not all types of speech are so protected; com-
mercial speech is “[c]ommunication (such as advertising and
marketing) that involves only the commercial interests of the
speaker and the audience, and is therefore afforded lesser First
Amendment protection than social, political, or religious speech.”82
The Supreme Court has “recognized a ‘commonsense’ distinction
between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs
in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other
varieties of speech.”83 Depending on the type of commercial speech
regulation, laws regarding commercial speech are typically subject
to either intermediate or rational basis scrutiny.84
The extent of an individual’s right to remain silent also varies
depending on the circumstances and content of the speech.85 Com-
pelling political speech is forbidden; the state cannot force an
individual “to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to
an ideological point of view he finds unacceptable.”86 On the other
hand, compelling a business to tell their consumers something, or
post certain information relevant to their commercial interests, is
more permissible under the First Amendment.87 How permissible it
is depends on the information the government wants relayed. Re-
quiring a business to post a certain political view or opinion runs
contrary to the core values of the First Amendment, but requiring a
business to inform consumers of relevant facts (e.g., the price, con-
dition, and proven side effects of its products) to prevent consumer
deception furthers underlying First Amendment values.88
Later sections of this Note will delve into this in more detail, but
some Circuits review all factual and uncontroversial commercial dis-
closure requirements under a rational basis, and not unjustified or
81. Core Political Speech, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, (10th ed. 2014); see also Meyer v. Grant,
486 U.S. 414, 421 (1988).
82. Commercial Speech, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, (10th ed. 2014); see also N.Y. State Rest.
Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 131–32 (“the protection afforded commercial speech is somewhat less ex-
tensive than that afforded noncommercial speech”).
83. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562
(1980) (internal quotation marks omitted).
84. See, e.g., Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2001). Some
Circuits do not refer to the specific standard of scrutiny by name, but rather by definition, for
the sake of simplicity, the standards are herein referred to by name. Some also say they are
unsure which standard should apply but under any standard, this is constitutional (or uncon-
stitutional, as the case may be).
85. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 629 (1943).
86. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977).
87. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
88. Id.
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unduly burdensome, standard; others may require that the disclo-
sure be for the purpose of correcting consumer deception to justify
applying the lower standard.89 The D.C. Circuit has stated that if the
disclosure required is not purely factual and uncontroversial, the
law should be reviewed by an intermediate or strict scrutiny test.90
However, the Sixth Circuit has held that the intermediate scrutiny
test is reserved for laws restricting commercial speech and that laws
compelling commercial speech are to be reviewed using a rational
basis test if the speech is factual and strict scrutiny if the speech is
opinion.91
Requiring a business to relay government speech, like a sign, in
order to obtain a government benefit—especially a fundamental
one like protection of property rights—is compelled speech and is
limited by the First Amendment.92 As the Second Circuit said in
Alliance for Open Society International, Inc. v. United States Agency for
International Development, “[c]ompelling speech as a condition of re-
ceiving a government benefit cannot be squared with the First
Amendment.”93 For example, if someone opens a restaurant on
their property, they are doing that voluntarily; the government is
not forcing them to open a restaurant or even use their property at
all. But that does not make any signs the government mandates as a
condition of being permitted to operate a restaurant any less com-
pelled.94 Similarly, just because a business owner is choosing to
operate a business and choosing to ban firearms, does not make the
sign the government requires them to post to operate a business
while banning firearms any less compelled.
2. Compelled Speech Relating to Politics or Opinion
The right of an individual or business not to express a govern-
ment opinion or political belief is a core First Amendment right;
laws impinging on this right are reviewed using a strict scrutiny
89. N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 133–34 (2d Cir. 2009);
Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 310 (1st Cir. 2005).
90. Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2014); see also Cent.
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
91. See Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 532 (6th Cir.
2012).
92. See All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 651 F.3d 218, 234 (2d
Cir. 2011).
93. Id.
94. See N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 132 (2d Cir. 2009)
(requiring restaurants to post calorie counts was compelled speech but not unconstitution-
ally compelled speech).
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test.95 The Seventh Circuit has summarized the Supreme Court’s
definition of strict scrutiny:
To survive strict scrutiny, the [law] must be narrowly tailored
to promote a compelling Government interest. Generally, a
statute is narrowly tailored only if it targets and eliminates no
more than the exact source of the ‘evil’ it seeks to remedy. Put
another way, a statute is not narrowly tailored if a less restric-
tive alternative would serve the Government’s purpose.96
The two seminal Supreme Court cases using strict scrutiny to bar
laws compelling statements of government opinions and political
beliefs are West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette and Wooley
v. Maynard.97 In Barnette, the Supreme Court found that a resolu-
tion by the West Virginia State Board of Education which mandated
that all students participate in the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag
on pain of expulsion and subsequent prosecution for delinquency
unconstitutionally violated the First Amendment.98 The plaintiffs
were Jehovah’s Witnesses who believed the Pledge broke the Sec-
ond Commandment forbidding the worship of graven images.99
The Court held that the flag was a “symbol of adherence to govern-
ment as presently organized. It requires the individual to
communicate by word and sign his acceptance of the political ideas
it thus bespeaks.”100 The Court found that the First Amendment
may only be infringed upon to protect against grave and immediate
danger to state interests and that the failure to salute the flag did
not present one of those dangers.101 In fact, the Court found that
forcing individuals to state an opinion they did not themselves hold
threatened democracy, stating that “[t]hose who begin coercive
elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissent-
ers. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity
of the graveyard.”102 Similarly, in Wooley, the Supreme Court found
95. See Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc., 674 F.3d at 554.
96. Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir. 2006) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
97. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 629 (1943); Wooley v. Maynard,
430 U.S. 705, 716–17 (1977).
98. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 633.
101. See id. at 639–41; Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716–17.
102. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 639–41; see also id. at 642 (“If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein.”).
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that New Hampshire’s mandate that their state motto, “Live Free or
Die,” appear on license plates was unconstitutional because it re-
quired an individual to express adherence to a belief in a way of life
contrary to their true beliefs.103
After determining that firearms prohibition signs are compelled
speech, the next question determining the limits of firearms prohi-
bition signs is whether or not they are pure commercial speech or
social/political speech by a business. Since commercial speech is
defined as speech only related to the commercial interest of the
speaker,104 a “No Guns” sign, even at a retail location, may not qual-
ify as pure commercial speech, because it relays a voluntary
judgment by the business owner on what may be permitted on his
private property based on his personal morals and opinions about
safety.
Some courts have also framed the issue in the context of com-
mercial speech as turning on whether the speech relays a
controversial or noncontroversial fact.105 From the recent presiden-
tial political campaigns it is clear that gun regulation, like
abortions, is one of a few issues that motivates a large number of
single-issue voters.106 Like abortion regulations, firearms regula-
tions must be viewed carefully in the greater context of the fierce
public debate over the morality and efficacy of firearms bans be-
cause the First Amendment is designed to safeguard expression on
public issues.107
The Second Circuit has found that how, when, and what factual
information on controversial political issues is relayed by a business
is not pure commercial speech and is further protected by the First
Amendment.108 For example, the court found that two out of three
of New York City’s posting laws regulating “pregnancy services” cen-
ters (religiously affiliated institutions that appear to be medical
centers seeking to attract pregnant women and discourage them
from seeking an abortion or emergency contraception) violated the
First Amendment.109 The court found that intermediate or strict
scrutiny should apply because the compelled speech involved was
103. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715 (“New Hampshire’s statute in effect requires that appellees
use their private property as a “mobile billboard” for the State’s ideological message[.]”).
104. See Commercial Speech, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
105. Evergreen Ass’n v. City of New York, 740 F.3d 233, 249–50 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Because
it mandates discussion of controversial political topics, the Services Disclosure differs from
the ‘brief, bland, and non-perjorative disclosure’ required by the Status Disclosure.”).
106. Sam Frizell, Why Hillary Clinton Thinks Gun Control Can Win in 2016, TIME MAGAZINE
(Nov. 25, 2015), http:///time.com/4101947/hillary-clinton-guns-democrats/.
107. Evergreen Ass’n, 740 F.3d at 249.
108. Id. at 245.
109. Id.
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not the disclosure of purely factual and uncontroversial informa-
tion about a commercial transaction by a commercial entity.110 The
city’s interest in preventing delays in access to reproductive health
services was compelling and the requirement that centers disclose
whether the center has a licensed medical professional on staff was
sufficiently narrowly tailored because it was the only way the city
could be sure that a person would be informed if a particular facil-
ity offered medical services.111
However, the court found that “[a] requirement that pregnancy
services centers address abortion, emergency contraception, or pre-
natal care at the beginning of their contact with potential clients
alters the centers’ political speech by mandating the manner in
which the discussion of these issues begins” and was therefore not
sufficiently narrowly tailored because the information could be im-
plied by presence or lack of medical staff.112 Finally, the court found
that the requirement that the center post, in conjunction with the
disclosure of the existence of medical services, a message from the
New York Department of Health, stating that the New York Depart-
ment of Health encourages women who might be pregnant to
consult with a licensed professional, was also not sufficiently nar-
rowly tailored as it would force the centers to state government
speech that could be effectively conveyed through alternate means,
such as public advertising.113
Similarly, in Entertainment Software Association v. Blagojevich, the
Seventh Circuit found that a regulation requiring that certain video
games be labeled as sexually explicit was subject to strict scrutiny
review because the regulation forced businesses to adopt the regu-
lator’s subjective opinion on what was sexually explicit.114 In Alliance
110. Id. at 245 n.6.
111. Id. at 247.
112. Id. at 249–50 (2d Cir. 2014). Other courts are less willing to apply higher standards
of scrutiny just because the subject matter is controversial. C.f. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery,
Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 569 (6th Cir. 2012) (“As set forth above, whether a disclo-
sure is scrutinized under Zauderer [setting a rational basis standard for compelled disclosure
of purely factual information] turns on whether the disclosure conveys factual information or
an opinion, not on whether the disclosure emotionally affects its audience or incites
controversy.”).
113. Evergreen Ass’n v. City of New York, 740 F.3d 233, 250–51 (2d Cir. 2014). C.f. Texas
Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 576 (5th Cir. 2012)
(“First, informed consent laws that do not impose an undue burden on the woman’s right to
have an abortion are permissible if they require truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant disclo-
sures. Second, such laws are part of the state’s reasonable regulation of medical practice and
do not fall under the rubric of compelling “ideological” speech that triggers First Amend-
ment strict scrutiny. Third, “relevant” informed consent may entail not only the physical and
psychological risks to the expectant mother facing this “difficult moral decision,” but also the
state’s legitimate interests in “protecting the potential life within her.”).
114. Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 652 (7th Cir. 2006).
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for Open Society International, Inc. v. United States Agency for Interna-
tional Development, the Second Circuit also found that conditioning
the receipt of federal funds for the prevention of HIV/AIDS on an
NGO’s open condemnation of prostitution warranted heightened
scrutiny and was unconstitutional because “the targeted speech . . .
is the subject of international debate.115 The right to communicate
freely on such matters of public concern lies at the heart of the First
Amendment.”116
Just as “pregnancy services” centers can be compelled to disclose
the vital consumer information about the presence or absence of
medical personnel, so can a business be required to disclose if fire-
arms are banned from their facility if they want to enforce the ban,
because notice of potential criminal liability is information vital to
both a businesses’ consumers and law enforcement. However, just
as regulations affecting the center’s ability to introduce and relay its
position on the highly charged issue of abortion must be scruti-
nized under heightened scrutiny, so too must regulations effecting
how a business expresses its highly controversial decision to ban
firearms. The decision to post a “No Guns” sign is an inherently
political one rooted in the business owner’s personal beliefs and
the content of a sign expressing that decision will appear to express
the owner’s beliefs on the matter. Requiring a large sign with spe-
cific language and format can amount to the government forcing a
business owner to express their nuanced personal political belief
through a government form message. This compelled expression of
agreement with the government’s exact position amounts to com-
pelled political speech and necessitates heightened scrutiny.
3. Constitutional Compelled Commercial Speech
While compelling businesses to relay government political views
or opinions on matters of public debate is often prohibited, courts
have repeatedly ruled that requiring merchants to disclose certain
facts to consumers is constitutional compelled commercial
speech.117 Commercial speech is communication regarding “only
the commercial interests of the speaker and the audience.”118 The
Supreme Court has held that “[t]he government may ban forms of
communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it
115. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 651 F.3d 218, 225 (2d Cir.
2011).
116. Id. at 236.
117. E.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 650–51 (1985).
118. Commercial Speech, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, (10th ed. 2014).
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or commercial speech related to illegal activity.”119 Compelling the
disclosure of information on the hidden costs of a product, where a
product is from, and health risks of a product has been found con-
stitutional.120 For example, in Discount Tobacco City, requiring text
and image warning labels on cigarette cartons was considered con-
stitutional compelled speech.121
In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court established a four-part test
to determine the constitutionality of government restrictions of
commercial speech:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to
come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful ac-
tivity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted
governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield pos-
itive answers, we must determine whether the regulation
directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and
whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that
interest.122
In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, the Supreme Court in-
troduced a rational basis standard in reviewing laws compelling
commercial factual disclosures for the purpose of preventing con-
sumer deception.123 The law at issue in Zauderer was a requirement
that an attorney advertising that he took clients on a contingency
fee basis must also disclose that clients will have to pay court costs
even if their lawsuits are unsuccessful.124 The Supreme Court held
that while compelling citizens to speak prescribed opinions was sub-
ject to strict scrutiny, compelling businesses to disclose factual
information is constitutional so long as the “disclosure require-
ments are reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing
deception of consumers” and are not “unjustified or unduly bur-
densome” in a way that chills “protected commercial speech.”125
The Court stated that the biggest reason true and licit commercial
speech is constitutionally protected from restriction is the value ad-
ditional information provides to consumers, and accordingly, that a
119. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563–64
(1980) (internal citations omitted).
120. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651; N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d
114 (2d Cir. 2009); Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
121. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012).
122. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566.
123. Id. at 650.
124. Id. at 652.
125. Id. at 651.
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business’s protection from compelled disclosure of “any particular
factual information in [its] advertising is minimal,” because disclos-
ing more facts can only improve the information available to the
consumers.126 The Court said that it was reasonable to believe that
failing to disclose that clients would be liable for a lawsuit’s costs
even if they hire an attorney on a contingency fee basis might mis-
lead consumers into believing that a lawsuit would cost them
nothing if they lost.127 Accordingly, the Court found that the state
“requirement that appellant include in his advertising purely fac-
tual and uncontroversial information about the terms under which
his services will be available” was constitutional.128
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Zauderer, the lower
courts began using a rational basis standard of review for laws that
compelled the disclosure of “purely factual and uncontroversial in-
formation” to “[prevent] deception of consumers.”129 When the
compelled commercial speech was both not “factual” or “uncon-
troversial,” and was not intended to “[prevent] deception of
consumers,” courts used the strict scrutiny standard required for
compelled non-commercial speech or compelled opinions.130
When compelled commercial speech is factual but not intended
to prevent deception of consumers, many courts are uncertain as to
whether Zauderer’s rational basis scrutiny or Central Hudson’s inter-
mediate scrutiny should apply.131 Some argue that Zauderer is just an
application of Central Hudson, because the first step of the Central
Hudson test is to decide if the speech is First Amendment protected,
that is, speech that is not unlawful and not deceptive.132 Zauderer
explicitly permits compelled speech for the limited purpose of cor-
recting consumer deception, thus falling within the exception to
Central Hudson.133 Central Hudson says the First Amendment does
not give businesses the right to lie to their consumers; if a business’
speech is a lie, then they do not get any First Amendment protec-
tion, let alone intermediate scrutiny.134 Zauderer rational basis
scrutiny applies when allowing the business to remain silent—that
is allowing the business to hide a fact—would propagate a decep-
tion. Under this analysis, the use of rational basis scrutiny in
126. Id.
127. Id. at 653.
128. Id. at 651.
129. Id.
130. Id.; see Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 652 (7th Cir. 2006).
131. See Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
132. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
133. See id. at 562–63.
134. See id. at 563.
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Zauderer really turns on whether the compelled speech is meant to
prevent consumer deception. Laws compelling speech for purposes
other than to prevent consumer deception therefore should be
evaluated under the Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny test.135
However, other courts read Zauderer as turning more on the dif-
ference between restricting commercial speech (like in Central
Hudson) and compelling commercial speech than on correcting
consumer deception.136 Recently, at least three circuit courts have
started to apply the Zauderer rational basis test not just to “factual
and uncontroversial” compelled commercial speech intended to
“[prevent] consumer deception,” but also to “factual and uncon-
troversial” compelled commercial speech intended to serve
government interests other than correcting deception.137 For exam-
ple, the Second Circuit has found that it does not violate a
restaurant’s First Amendment rights to require it to post the calorie
counts of its dishes.138 The Second Circuit, following the Supreme
Court, applied the rational basis test because the regulations merely
compelled disclosure of purely factual and uncontroversial infor-
mation.139 They found that disclosure furthered rather than
hindered First Amendment values of truth and the free market of
ideas.140 Thus, the city mandate of the disclosure of the caloric in-
formation on menus was constitutional because it was reasonably
related to the legitimate state interest in combating obesity.141
Likewise, in American Meat Institute, the D.C. Circuit applied the
rational basis test and found that requiring meat producers to in-
clude country-of-origin labels on their packaging was reasonably
related to the government interests of “enabl[ing] consumers to
135. This argument was most notably adopted in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d
1205, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 2012), but that was overturned by Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,
760 F.3d 18, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“To the extent that other cases in this circuit may be read as
holding to the contrary and limiting Zauderer to cases in which the government points to an
interest in correcting deception, we now overrule them.”). While the D.C. Circuit may no
longer view this argument as valid, some other Circuits and the Supreme Court have not yet
decided the question.
136. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 552 (6th Cir. 2012)
(“Laws that restrict speech are fundamentally different than laws that require disclosures,
and so are the legal standards governing each type of law.”).
137. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 650 (1985); see, e.g., Am.
Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 21 (“To the extent that other cases in this circuit may be read as
holding to the contrary and limiting Zauderer to cases in which the government points to an
interest in correcting deception, we now overrule them”); Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe,
429 F.3d 294, 316 (1st Cir. 2005); Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 113–15 (2d
Cir. 2001).
138. N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 132 (2d Cir. 2009).
139. Id. at 132.
140. Id.; see also Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n, 272 F.3d at 114–15.
141. N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 132.
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choose American-made products; the demonstrated consumer in-
terest in extending country-of-origin labeling to food products; and
the individual health concerns and market impacts that can arise in
the event of a food-borne illness outbreak.”142  Accordingly, some
uncertainty remains if government action compelling commercial
speech for purposes other than to prevent consumer deception re-
ceives intermediate or rational basis scrutiny.
In this case, the “No Guns” signs are not meant to prevent con-
sumer deception, so if the Zauderer rational basis test should only be
applied when the purpose of the regulation is to prevent consumer
deception, Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny should apply. How-
ever, as previously noted, there has been a trend towards applying
Zauderer when the government justifies a regulation on grounds
other than preventing consumer deception. Accordingly, it is un-
likely that a court would subject the sign regulations to heightened
scrutiny just because they are not intended to prevent consumer
deception.
4. Unduly Burdensome Disclosures and Compelled Speech
Often it can be said that deciding the level of scrutiny decides the
case; in this instance, however, even under the rational basis test,
the Texas law fails because it is unduly burdensome. In 1985, the
Supreme Court introduced the idea that even if the state had a ra-
tional reason for compelling the disclosure of factual commercial
information, there was a line at which disclosure requirements be-
come so excessive as to become unconstitutional: “[w]e recognize
that unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements
might offend the First Amendment by chilling protected commer-
cial speech.”143 The Supreme Court looked further at this issue in
Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation.144 In Ibanez, the state
required anyone who used a specialist designation on a business
card, advertisement, or letterhead to have in immediate proximity a
disclaimer stating that the specialist designation was not govern-
ment sanctioned and outlining the “recognizing agency’s
requirements for recognition, including, but not limited to, educa-
tion, experience[,] and testing.”145 The Court, referencing Zauderer,
142. Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 23. See also, Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n, 429 F.3d at 310 n.8.
143. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
144. Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136 (1994).
145. Id. at 146.
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stated the disclosure requirement was an unduly burdensome re-
striction on First Amendment rights because there was no evidence
that the specialist designation actually deceived people and “[t]he
detail required in the disclaimer currently described by the Board
effectively rules out notation of the “specialist” designation on a
business card or letterhead, or in a yellow pages listing” because the
disclaimer required would take up too much space.146
Subsequent circuit court cases have helped draw the line be-
tween constitutional disclosure requirements and unduly
burdensome ones. For example, in Entm’t Software Ass’n v.
Blagojevich, the Seventh Circuit found that the requirement of a
four-inch sticker on a video game was insufficiently narrowly tai-
lored and was therefore unduly burdensome.147 The court
commented that the state failed to explain why a smaller sticker
would not suffice and stated that “[c]ertainly we would not con-
done a health department’s requirement that half of the space on a
restaurant menu be consumed by the raw shellfish warning.”148 The
court also stated that the requirement that video game retailers
have three eighteen-by-twenty-four inch signs in their stores was un-
duly burdensome, remarking that “many video game stores are as
small as one room in an indoor mall. Little imagination is required
to envision the spacing debacle that could accompany a small re-
tailer’s attempt to fit three signs, each roughly the size of a large
street sign, into such a space.”149
Other circuits’ dicta and decisions have suggested a similar take
on unduly burdensome disclosures. In American Meat, the D.C. Cir-
cuit said, “Finally, though it may be obvious, we note that Zauderer
cannot justify a disclosure so burdensome that it essentially oper-
ates as a restriction on constitutionally protected speech . . . [n]or
can it sustain mandates that ‘chill[ ] protected commercial
speech.’”150 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit held that a regulation of at-
torney advertising was unconstitutional when it required extensive
disclaimers printed in font as large as the largest font printed else-
where in the ad or spoken slower than the pitch in radio and video
ads.151 The court found there was insufficient evidence that the dis-
claimer’s font size and speed of speech were reasonably related to
the “substantial interests in preventing consumer deception and
146. Id.
147. Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 653 (7th Cir. 2006).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
151. Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. La. Att’y Disciplinary Bd., 632 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2011).
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preserving the ethical standards of the legal profession.”152 Addi-
tionally, the court found that the large font and slow speech
requirements for lengthy disclaimers effectively eliminated a law-
yer’s ability to use small print ads or short radio or TV commercials,
thus unduly limiting the lawyer’s constitutionally protected
speech.153
An easy parallel can be drawn to the larger and more complex
“No Guns” signs required by some states if businesses want to ban
guns under pain of criminal sanctions. The Texas sign require-
ments are a perfect example: business owners wanting to ban both
open and concealed carry of handguns have to conspicuously post a
sign (or two, presently no single sign covering both 30.06 and 30.07
seems to be commercially available. Regardless, given the font size
mandated, even a combined sign would still probably be at least 4
feet tall and two feet wide) in English and Spanish (with contrasting
colored block letters at least an inch high) where the English reads
exactly:
“Pursuant to Section 30.06, Penal Code (trespass by license
holder with a concealed handgun), a person licensed under
Subchapter H, Chapter 411, Government Code (handgun li-
censing law), may not enter this property with a concealed
handgun.”154
“Pursuant to Section 30.07, Penal Code (trespass by license
holder with an openly carried handgun), a person licensed
under Subchapter H, Chapter 411, Government Code (hand-
gun licensing law), may not enter this property with a
handgun that is carried openly.”155
The question the Texas government would have to answer on
judicial review, regardless of the standard of scrutiny, is the same as
the ones the government had to answer in Ibanez, Entertainment
Software, and even Evergreen Association: does the disclosure require-
ment unduly burden the business’s speech?156 Like in Ibanez and
Entertainment Software,157 a court confronted with the size, detail,
and placement of the sign Texas requires (estimated about two feet
152. Id. at 229.
153. Id.
154. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.06 (West 2011 & Supp. 2016) (concealed carry
trespassing).
155. PENAL § 30.07 (open carry trespassing).
156. Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 146 (1994); see Entm’t
Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 653 (7th Cir. 2006).
157. Id.
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by four feet in a prominent location) will almost certainly find it
unduly burdensome, particularly when confronted with the alterna-
tive of the moderately sized universal prohibition sign accompanied
by the statute cite that other states have adopted that achieves the
government end of notice just as well as the large sign required by
Texas.
Requiring a very large firearms prohibition sign with extensive
government language will unduly limit the store owners’ ability to
speak on the subject themselves, for, once having posted a two-by-
four-foot sign, it is unlikely the average small business owner will
have room for any other signs to explain the nuances of his position
on the subject, or indeed, any other. This restriction on a business
owner’s speech effectively curtails his First Amendment rights to
join the national and local debate on a critical political issue. Just
like the large stickers and signs found unduly burdensome by the
Seventh Circuit in Entertainment Software Association and the long ex-
planation found unduly burdensome by the Supreme Court in
Ibanez, the signs required by Texas are unnecessarily large and,
given the small size of most retailers, seriously and unconstitution-
ally limit a business’s speech.
Accordingly, states must ensure that they adapt reasonable signs
requirements such that they do not unduly burden speech or exces-
sively express government messages so as not to run afoul of the
First Amendment. The model rule proposed in Part III is composed
with these First Amendment limitations in mind.
III. A MODEL LAW FOR THE PROHIBITION OF GUNS IN
BUSINESSES OPEN TO THE PUBLIC
After examining the deficiencies in the existing laws on firearms
prohibitions the solution is clear: states should uniformly amend
their trespass or firearms codes to automatically impose criminal
sanctions for carrying a handgun or long gun (open or concealed)
on private property conspicuously marked with the standard sign
many states have already adopted—a pictogram, small enough to
be printed from a computer, of a gun with a circle around it and a
slash through it. The prohibition sign should be accompanied by
the words: “Open and Concealed Carry of Firearms Prohibited
Under [statute number cite].” The standardization of the sign and
its simplicity will enable national businesses to enact it universally
and make clear to businesses, gun carriers, and law enforcement
what the law is. Giving the sign the automatic force of law will both
protect businesses from the unenviable position of having to ask
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individuals with guns to leave and discourage gun carriers from
flaunting the proscriptions they know businesses owners are too in-
timidated to enforce.
Finally, the reasonable size, cost, and speech of the sign will guar-
antee it is sufficiently narrowly tailored to meet the government
interest of providing notice to gun carriers without being unduly
burdensome to businesses, saving the legislation from being struck
down as unconstitutional compelled speech. The difference be-
tween Supreme Court dicta in Zauderer and Ibanez illustrates why the
Texas sign laws are unconstitutional as unduly burdensome while
the ones proposed here are not. In Zauderer, the Supreme Court
held it was reasonable to require that an attorney advertising that
he took clients on a contingency fee basis also include a line in his
advertisement saying that clients will have to pay court costs even if
their lawsuits are unsuccessful.158 In Ibanez the Court implied it was
unduly burdensome to demand that whenever a lawyer used a spe-
cialist designation in a business card, letterhead, or ad, that they
also make a disclaimer
in the immediate proximity of the statement that implies for-
mal recognition as a specialist; the disclaimer must stat[e] that
the recognizing agency is not affiliated with or sanctioned by
the state or federal government, and it must set out the recog-
nizing agency’s requirements for recognition, including, but
not limited to, educatio[n], experience[,] and testing.159
In Ibanez the required text was so lengthy so as to effectively fore-
close the possibility of using the specialist designation on
letterhead, business cards, or newspaper ads,160 in Texas the re-
quired signage is so large so as to effectively foreclose the possibility
of banning firearms in small businesses. Like the short disclaimer
required in Zauderer,161 the modest proposed model regulation
sign size, the size of a piece of printer paper, is the minimum size
required to effectively communicate the necessary, brief message.
158. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 652 (1985).
159. Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 146 (1994) (internal quotations omitted).
160. Id.
161. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652.
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A. Location of the Statute
Where a law is located in the state code can have an effect on the
breadth of its use and its meaning. Laws regulating banning fire-
arms from private property are sourced from one of four places: the
concealed carry statue, the firearms statute, a specific provision in
the trespass code, or mere implication in the trespass code.162 For
example, the Texas statutes, 30.06 and 30.07, are properly located
in the Texas Penal Code Chapter on Burglary and Criminal Tres-
pass, and are thus easy to find and outline clear penalties for
violations.163
Mississippi firearms and trespass statutes, on the other hand,
have remained wholly silent on the issue. The Mississippi Attorney
General has filled the void by issuing an opinion that reads into the
trespass statute the ability of the owner or manager of a store or
restaurant to deny entry, verbally or by posting a sign, to people
carrying open or concealed weapons on penalty of criminal sanc-
tions.164 While the breadth of the implied exclusionary power of the
Mississippi criminal trespass statute is empowering to business own-
ers who want to exclude any type of weapon from being carried in
any way on their premises, there is a critical notice problem. Busi-
ness owners do not have any way of knowing they have this silent
right—it is unlikely they read the Mississippi AG’s advisory opinions
to the legislature in their spare time. Likewise, firearm carriers are
given little notice that they have a legal obligation to comply with
posted signs on pain of criminal penalties. Explicitly writing into
the trespass statute or the firearms statute a right of business owners
to exclude, with the posting of a sign, handguns and long guns
from being carried onto their premises, openly or concealed, under
pains of imprisonment or fine, will correct this notice problem, em-
power business owners, and protect gun carriers from accidental
violations.
B. Breadth of the Statute
Part III.B will examine how the breadth of the underlying state
statute affects a business owner’s ability to effectively ban firearms:
Does it specifically allow for the ban of long guns and handguns?
162. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 30.06–.07 (West 2011 & Supp. 2016); Miss. Att’y
Gen. Op. No. 2013-00114, 2013 Miss. AG LEXIS 111 (2013).
163. PENAL §§ 30.06–.07.
164. Miss. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 2013-00114, 2013 Miss. AG LEXIS 111 (2013).
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Does it allow for the ban of open and concealed carry? Does viola-
tion of the sign carry the threat of criminal sanctions?
1. Handguns and Long Guns
The specific language of the statute has the most significant im-
pact on how much it protects a business owner’s rights. For
example, Texas statutes 30.06 and 30.07 explicitly permit the exclu-
sion of open and concealed handguns by posting a sign.165 The
statutes do not, however, address a business owner’s ability to ex-
clude long guns.166 So, while a Texas business owner with properly
posted 30.06 and 30.07 signs can exclude under pain of criminal
penalty the .38 a customer has on his belt, the business owner is
nowhere explicitly given the power to exclude the AR-15 semi-auto-
matic rifle a customer has strapped across his chest. Indeed,
applying the commonly used rule of statutory construction, expressio
unius est exclusio alterius,167 the existence of a criminal trespass stat-
ute stating that handguns can be prohibited with properly posted
signs, implies that other weapons cannot be prohibited with signs,
because if the legislature had intended them to be prohibited, they
would have been included in the statute or the statute would have
been written more broadly. The specificity of Texas’s sign legisla-
tion thus endangers a business owner’s right to exclude long guns,
which otherwise might have been read into the criminal trespass
statute.
Model legislation should either use the term “firearms,” which
includes handguns and long guns, or list both specifically. An ideal
sign would state “Open and Concealed Carry of Firearms Prohib-
ited Under [statute number cite],” with the universal prohibition
symbol.
2. Open and Concealed
Similarly, it is imperative that business owners are explicitly em-
powered by the statute to ban both the open and concealed carry of
firearms. In general, training should be required for a concealed
carry permit and it should not just cover how to safely use and store
a firearm, but also the laws governing when a firearm can be used
165. PENAL §§ 30.06–.07.
166. PENAL §§ 30.06–.07.
167. The expression of one thing means the exclusion of others.
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and where it can be carried. An explanation of a concealed permit
holder’s legal obligation to obey “No Guns” signs on pain of crimi-
nal penalty should be included in the permit training and in the
permit paperwork. Furthermore, conviction of trespass with a fire-
arm should automatically result in the revocation of a conceal-carry
permit. While a permit revocation would probably be temporary,
depending on the state, a violator may have to petition to get it
reinstated. In “may-issue” states, however, the sheriff could take a
past concealed carry permit violation and revocation as a reason
not to reissue a permit. Criminal trespass is typically a misdemeanor
offense and the penalty is usually a fine. While the proper penalty
for trespass with a firearm is beyond the scope of this Note, to en-
sure compliance, the law must have teeth beyond a nominal fine,
especially when few concealed carriers can reasonably expect to get
caught because by nature, their weapon is hidden from view. Con-
cealed carriers might be willing to risk a nominal fine if they can
afford to pay, but the threat of revocation of a concealed carry per-
mit might have more of a significant deterrence effect because
getting a permit that has been revoked reinstated might be difficult
in some states. Our country also has a tradition of prohibiting
felons of any sort from buying guns.168 Prohibiting people who have
a misdemeanor conviction specifically for violating the concealed
carry law from carrying a concealed gun seems consistent with that
tradition. Carrying a gun onto properly posted premises banning
guns is a criminal act with a firearm and should at least result in the
revocation of a concealed carry permit.
3. Force of Law
The effectiveness of the firearms prohibition signs in protecting
business owners’ rights hinges largely on whether the signs them-
selves are given the force of law. For example, in Kansas, the
legislature has adopted a reasonably sized standard pictogram for
their sign, however, they have declined to give the sign the force of
law, as evidenced in the relevant statute:
168. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1) (2012); see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570,
626 (2008) (“From Blackstone through the 19th century cases, commentators and courts
routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in
any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose. For example, the majority of the 19th-
century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weap-
ons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues.”).
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It shall be a violation of this section to carry a concealed hand-
gun in violation of any restriction or prohibition allowed by
subsection (a) or (b) if the building is posted in accordance
with rules and regulations adopted by the attorney general
pursuant to subsection (i). Any person who violates this sec-
tion shall not be subject to a criminal penalty but may be
subject to denial to such premises or removal from such
premises.169
This means that, even if a business has a properly posted sign giving
clear notice to all comers that firearms are prohibited, before busi-
ness owners are given the protection of trespass law, they must walk
up to the person with the gun, personally ask them to leave, and the
person with the gun must refuse.170 Once an armed person has
been asked to leave a store and has refused, the situation has likely
escalated beyond simple trespassing. Every time a person with a gun
walks into a posted store the owner has to make a potentially life
threatening decision: will he risk antagonizing a person with a gun
in a room full of vulnerable people he is responsible for—his em-
ployees, his customers, and maybe even his family—just to assert his
fundamental right to control what comes onto his private property?
The answer is almost certainly no and the people with guns know
that.
Without the force of law, firearms prohibition signs like Kansas’s
are not worth the paper they are printed on; indeed, it is truly mys-
tifying why Kansas took the time to write the signs into their code at
all because a business owner can always ask someone to leave for
nearly any reason.171 In glaring contrast, Kansas’s standard trespass
law only requires a personal request to vacate the premise by the
owner or authorized person or posting “No Trespassing” signs in a
“manner reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders,”
not both.172 To truly protect a business owner’s fundamental prop-
erty rights and ensure their safety we must similarly give firearms
prohibition signs the force of law.
169. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c10(e)(1) (Supp. 2016).
170. Even this power is uncertain, and this author presumes it here under a theory that
Kansas did not intend to wholly abrogate a private property owner’s fundamental right to
control who is on their property, which has, to the author’s knowledge, only notably been
limited by the civil rights movement and exceptional First Amendment cases.
171. It is also worth noting that Kansas has taken another questionable step to dis-incen-
tivize attempts at firearms prohibitions. If the business owner fails to provide “adequate
security measures” and permits conceal carry, he will not be liable for any wrongful act on his
premises with a concealed handgun. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c10(c)(1) (Supp. 2016).
172. § 21-5808.
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The relevant state statutes should be amended to automatically
impose criminal sanctions for the violation of a properly posted
sign, without the additional requirements of a personal request to
leave. This Note suggests adapting language common to criminal
trespass statutes e.g.: “Criminal trespass with a firearm is entering or
remaining in a privately owned premises while carrying a handgun
or a long gun, openly or concealed, in violation of an order by the
owner or another authorized person, OR when such premises are
posted in a location reasonably likely to come to the attention of
entrants with the [the sign described above] prohibiting firearms.”
IV. CONCLUSION
The First Amendment has long been recognized as a dual right:
with few exceptions, individuals have the right to speak and the
right to remain silent.173 The Second Amendment has heretofore
been recognized as the right to bear arms for the purposes of self-
defense.174 It is long past time for states to begin to protect the nec-
essary inverse just as vigorously—the right to exclude firearms for
the purposes of self-defense.175 108,000 people are shot each year in
the United States.176 The Supreme Court has made much of ensur-
ing people have the right to carry firearms to protect themselves,
but has done little to ensure people have the far more effective
right of self-defense through the ability to protect themselves and
their property from firearms.177 Giving business owners real options
in making the decision of how they want to protect themselves by
permitting sensible, standardized firearms prohibition signs to have
the force of law is an essential step towards protecting Americans’
gun rights, property rights, and lives.
173. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
174. See D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 584 (2008).
175. See Joseph Blocher, The Right Not to Keep And Bear Arms, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1 53-4
(2012).
176. Key Gun Violence Statistics, BRADY CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE (Jan 22, 2015),
http:///www.bradycampaign.org/key-gun-violence-statistics.
177. Press Release, Brady Campaign To Prevent Gun Violence, New Campaign Ad Fea-
tures Classic NRA Fearmongering, Myth That A Gun In The Home Makes You Safer (Sept.
22, 2016) http:///www.bradycampaign.org/press-room/new-campaign-ad-features-classic-
nra-fearmongering-myth-that-a-gun-in-the-home-makes-you (“Owning a gun is linked to a
higher risk of being shot in homicides, suicides, and unintentional shootings. In fact, re-
search has shown that a gun in the home makes a homicide two to three times as likely and
suicide three to five times more likely . . . For every time a gun is used in self-defense, it is
used: 11 times for completed and attempted suicides, 7 times in criminal assaults and homi-
cides, and 4 times in unintentional shooting deaths or injuries.”).
